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ABSTRACT
While all good managers have always considered risk in their decision
making, only recently have formal programs to do so been introduced. This
report covers the logical structure behind the formulation of an integrated risk
management plan (IRM). Included in the report are factors forcing the
development of a forTnal plan to consider risk, the basic objective or purpose of
an IRM, and desirable traits of such a plan. The report moves on to a
discussion of background issues, seeks to formalize some definitions, and
then discusses required information on threats. The report concludes with the
steps for an IRM.
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INTRODUCTION:
Any program should have a strong foundation that explains why the
program is needed, what drives the program, what characteristics the program
should possess, how the program will be used and by whom, and what the
program hopes to accomplish. Said another way, every program needs a
strong theoretical background that relates to not only its design but also to its
usage. Action or activity demands reason. The intention of this paper is to
present the beginning formulation of the background and theory of an
integrated risk management program.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
An integrated risk management plan, IRM, is related to helping a
particular office or program incorporate risk into its decision making. The plan
is tied to the entity that it supports.
Following a logical formation of ideas requires a statement of the
purpose of an IRM. For reasons expressed later, a success statement is also
necessary.
BASIC OBJECTIVE OF AN IRM PLAN
TO FACILITATE GOOD DECISIONS WHICH
INCORPORATE THE CONSIDERATION OF RISK
AND
MOVE TO THE FOREFRONT OF MANAGERIAL CONSIDERATION "rHOSE
ITEMS WHICH ARE REAL AND MEANINGFUL THREATS TO THE STATED
PURPOSE OF THE OFFICE OR PROGRAM
SUCCESS STATEMENT
THIS MODEL WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IF
IT ASSISTS IN THE DECISION PROCESS
THREATS ARE MOVED TO THE FOREFRONT
IT GETS INCORPORATED WIDELY THROUGHOUT THE SYSTEM WHICH IT
SUPPORTS
In essence, the objective statement expresses what the plan purports to
do and the success statement helps to identify if the plan has successfully
accomplished its objective. Note that while the two statements are similar and
related, they are also somewhat different.
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DRIVERS FOR IRM
All good managers have always considered risk. A reasonable question
to ask then is what is new with IRM? A common question within the space
station is what does IRM bring to the table? If it has always been done and
good managers have always done it, why is it needed?
While it is true that risk has always been considered, what has been
missing is a formal, structured program to consider risk. There are at least
three drivers that mandate structure on the consideration of risk - complexity,
consequence, and credibility.
Comolexitv
The complexity of technological decision making has increased
significantly with time. Technological systems have more component parts
and there are a larger number of choices for each of these parts. This increase
in numbers, of course, increases the interaction between component systems.
Said another way, society desires to do more than it has ever done and has
more to do it with. As a specific example, the Space Station is arguably the
most complex project ever undertaken by mankind.
(_onsequence
The consequences of technical decisions can have a much greater
negative impact that ever before. One only needs to consider Chernobyl,
Bhopal, and other well publicized incidents to realize that the wrong decision
can wipe out a program, a product, a company, a culture, or even a civilization.
The dollar value of decisions is only one of many parameters which can
be negatively impacted. The environment, culture, government, and even
heredity are all candidates for damage from a bad technical decision. Never
before in history has man had the capability to do so much damage and to do it
so quickly.
Credibility
Given that complexity and consequence have increased, a conscientious
manager is going to demand that subordinates present convincing arguments
that risk has been considered. Otherwise, when this manager presents the
case to upper management, credibility will be lost. As an aside, most
managers would favor the consideration of a risk and perhaps the taking of a
risk over the posture of never having considered the risk, particularly if the risk
materializes into a negative incident.
Perhaps in the age of the slide rule, risk need not be considered
formally. In the age of the computer, with rapid communications and advanced
technologies, a formal program to consider risk is mandatory.
14-4
DESIRABLE TRAITS OF AN IRM PLAN
There are certain traits that are desirable in an IRM plan. These
characteristics will help to identify component parts of a proposed plan.
Reoroducible
Work effort that is produced by an IRM should be reproducible in the
sense that given the same input and assumptions at a later date, then it
should be possible to arrive at basically the same conclusions concerning risk.
The logic should not decay with time.
As the program matures it is foreseeable that some early decision will
be reconsidered at a much later date. At this point, the conclusions concerning
risk and the logic and structure that led to these conclusions should be
reproducible.
TransoortablQ
Two different analysts, sitting in different locations and given the same
data and assumptions, should arrive at somewhat the same conclusions
regarding risk. As an example with the space station, analysts at JSC, KSC,
MSFC, and Headquarters should have somewhat the same results given the
same basic information.
SimDle
Given that one of the criterion's for success is that the system be widely
accepted, it must be as simple as possible. As an aside, many engineering
managers have little or no training in statistics. As of this writing for example,
two of five engineering undergraduate programs at the University of Houston do
not require statistics To this end, a complicated statistics package will have
difficulty gaining wide spread acceptance. Simpler is better and the leaner the
plan, the more likely is the acceptance. The longevity of the plan is also more
than likely tied to its simplicity.
Based on the normal method of doing business
The supposition here is that good managers have always considered
risk management. The IRM should just fit in naturally with what the managers
are used to doing. For the most part this means that the IRM should follow the
same breakdown that is used to structure the work. If a work break down
structure is used, for example, then the IRM should follow the same WBS
structure.
Managers will have enough to learn and do without having a system
imposed on them that is totally different than what they normally do. The closer
this system fits with the normal work of the managers then the more likely that it
will be adopted and used.
Helos to remove or identify bias
Managers use intuition. Intuition is gained by experience. Experience
introduces bias. Some people are risk takers and some are risk avoiders. All
are influenced by past experience. Change the experience base and the
underlying factors which influence decisions may become obscured. A
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desirable trait of an IRM would be to eliminate bias in the decision process.
This would seem to be virtually impossible. Thus the goal becomes one of
identifying and understanding the bias.
Should be capable of evolution
With time, the concept of the work will change. The IRM must change
with the work. As a prime example, early on, design and development are
prime considerations. Hopefully, the plan will evolve with the work into the
manufacturing or operations stage.
Verifiable
One of the real worries with risk management is whether all of the
important issues have been considered. Has something been overlooked that
shouldn't have been? A verification step helps to provide credibility and to
increase confidence that nothing major has been missed.
BACKGROUND ISSUES
The following is a brief discussion of some of the background issues
related to risk management. The intent here is to provide additional insight to
the plan that is developed later.
Two different uses of RM
Risk management can be used either in alternative selection, a static
use, or operations/development control, a dynamic use. In the static use, RM
can be used to choose between alternatives. Risk, then, becomes another
variable to consider in the selection among choices. In the dynamic version of
RM, risk is used to predict how well a particular plan is going to work.
Much of the literature on risk is related to the dynamic use of RM. One of
the characteristics of the dynamic state is the existence of data. Having data
allows for the usage of such tools as control limits. The scarcity of data and
data streams makes the consideration of risk in the static usage more
complex.
Risk is temporal
The objective of a program, and the related definition of success, change
with time. As the definition of success changes, so must the concept of risk.
As a specific example, consider the space shuttle. For its first launch, success
was more than likely defined as getting it up, getting it down, and not injuring
anyone or anything. After f_y launches, one would suppose that the objective
would be significantly more robust.
The concept of risk being tied to time is, of course, related to the trait
concerning evolution discussed above. The RM program must have the
capability of changing as the program changes.
Risk is hier,i_rchical
It would be naive to suppose that the person at the top of a very complex
program would define success in the same manner as the person in charge of
some small sub-element many levels down in the structure. While these
concepts of success are related, they are different. Thus the risk is considered
differently and, to some extent, must be managed differently.
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The risk manaoer is like a lifequard
The question comes up, unfortunately too frequently, as to what does the
risk manager bring to the table. After all, the functional manager has some
capability or they would not be the manager. What do they need the risk
manger for?
As a philosophical orientation to the subject, consider a lifeguard at the
local swimming pool. They are not there to stop you from swimming in deep
water. They are there to warn you when the water is getting deep and to assist
you if you get in over your head and cannot cope. Too some degree, the job of
the risk manager is similar. They are not there to make the decision for the
functional manager. They are there to wam of trouble and to assist in the event
that trouble does indeed occur.
Exoosur_
This program, like any other innovative program, requires real,
substantial involvement of upper management. If the upper management
exposure is not real and tangible, then middle management will kill it off. When
middle management sees that upper management has committed to the
program in a real and tangible way, then they too will commit and the program
has a chance.
DEFINITIONS
One of the difficulties in discussing risk is that the words, to a large
degree, are known and understood by everyone. Unfortunately they are usually
understood differently by different people. One of the first things to do with any
risk management plan is to well define the terms and then to discipline
everyone to use the terms as defined and only as defined. This, more than
anything else, will help to abate the hours of discussion that the consideration
of an IRM will promulgate.
The following list defines many of the terms used in the rest of this
paper. While the list is not complete, it does contain the most common terms.
Threat - Any real or perceived state or condition which would or could
have a negative impact on the stated purpose or success of an entity.
Note that a perceived condition is important. If people feel that something is
true, then their actions are influenced, whether the thing is true or not. Also
note that threat is tied to purpose, objective, and success.
.Risk - Throughout this paper, risk is used in the non-technical sense.
To be more precise, to some authorities, risk is the analytical product of
likelihood and consequence, the mathematical expectation. In this paper, it will
be used only in the vague sense.
Prodromal event - An event which is a precursor of a condition, a
warning.
Unfortunately, prodromes are those things most often seen in retrospect,
looking backwards, after a calamity. Storm clouds are a prodrome for rain and
wind. An open barn door is a prodrome for a stolen horse.
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Parameter - Something which is measured with the intention of
reflecting or showing a condition or state.
In the sense that it is used here, part of the task is to determine what
parameters to measure so that they, to some degree, reflect the risk that is
involved.
THREATS
Must be tied to a ouroose or obiectiye
When one discusses threats, the first question is and must be - a threat
to what? If one does not know what is threatened, the concept becomes fuzzy
and the possibility of successful abatement becomes less likely. Too often the
discussion of threat or risk is reduced to a sort of "boogie man in the closet"
issue. For a threat to be real, what is threatened must be known.
Threats can be self. uo. down. or across threats
Consider the tree diagram of a typical WBS chart. An office in that
diagram has offices above it and below it. It also has offices which are not in
the same string of offices and which can only be reached by going up, across,
and then down another string.
Self threats are those against the stated purpose or objective of the
given office. These are threats which that office should know and understand
best. To some degree, the office will also be familiar with up and down threats.
It is the across threats which may be the most obscure. It is reasonable to
suppose that the given office will have less knowledge about environments far
from them. It is with threats of this sort that the IRM office may be most useful.
Required information on any threat
Other than the basic assumptions and determining what the threat is to,
there is some desired information on any threat. Almost any manager, when
presented with a statement of threat,
confidence, warning, likelihood, and
Confidence - What confidence
will want to know at least four things:
consequence.
does the analyst have in the figures or
statements presented? Is the threat information based on solid firm
information or is it based on a vague feeling? The confidence that the
analyst has in the figures will, to some degree, be reflected in how
seriously management considers the threat.
Prodromal events - Will the threat materialize with little or no warning or
will there be time to react as events unfold? Threats which materialize
with little warning represent, to some degree, a less palatable threat
than one which gives you plenty of time to get ready.
Consequence/impact - If the threat materializes, what will be the end
result or range of results? How bad can it get?
- Here the consideration is one of probability. How probable
is the threat to materialize?
As a special consideration, the determination of likelihood and of consequence
is very difficult. It is at this point that the discussion of proposed risk
management plans seems to become impaled on hours and hours of circular
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reasoning. For this reason, and others, in what follows, we will use a five point
scale to represent each of confidence, likelihood or consequence: very low,
low, moderate, high, and very high. Obviously, these words will have different
interpretations in different situations. The intent is to use the term and then to
let discussion add meaning to the term.
USAGE
The question now becomes one of usage. Who will use the IRM and for
what will it be used? Knowing the intended usage of a system is of paramount
importance in designing the system.
The plan which is described in this paper will, of course, be used by
everyone. However, the end user will be upper management. They are the
ones charged with the most responsibility, thus they are the ones who have the
end authority on whether risk has been considered and managed. To some
degree, an IRM can be considered as a security blanket for upper
management.
At this point, a word about numerical representations of risk is
appropriate. The danger with any parameterized system is that too much will
be read into a number that is generated. The only thing that can add definition
and understanding to a generated number is usage and time.
As an example, suppose the risk of a particular entity was reported to be
0.7 on a 0 to 1 scale with 0 being low and 1 being high. What does 0.7 mean?
How does it compare to someone else's 0.6 or 0.8? Only use and time can
add the required definition. The most important use of the number is two-fold.
One is to track the number over time. In our example, if the risk went to 0.8 in
the next reporting period, most managers would understand that the risk
posture was getting worse. Conversely, if the risk went to 0.6, most would
understand that the risk was getting better. Tracking over time and looking at
the trending of the number provides insight into the risk posture. The other use
of a number is to give management the opportunity to explain the number. If
the risk is reported as 0.7, the obvious question is why is it 0.7 and not 0.6 or
0.8. What is the explanation for the number?. Again, time and use will add
definition and reason to any parameter that is produced.
THE ENVIRONMENT
In order to understand the proposed plan, a brief discussion of the
author's understanding of the environment is essential. No plan can be lifted
directly from one environment and placed into another without modification.
The literature is replete with examples of industries and companies who have
tried this and failed.
The way the work at the space station seems to be structured is that the
tasks are distributed among integrated product teams (IPT's). There are
somewhere around 100 such teams, depending on how they are counted. If
one thinks of a typical tree structure as in a WBS the IPT's are somewhat
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similar. Every so often in the structure, they have introduced an Analysis and
Integration team charged with the responsibility of integrating the levels below
them. The intention of this structure is to empower the teams by forcing the
decision making to as low a level as possible.
THE PLAN
The basic plan is to have the IPT's report their risk posture to upper level
management on a routine and regular basis. If this is done often enough, then
trending will develop and information will be gained. Due to the large number
of teams, some subset will have to report each time. A typical plan would have
a regular time slot each week for reporting, say two hours. Then the teams
would be grouped in some natural ordering following the AIT structure and
each would expect to report during their time slot when their particular grouping
was presenting. Their turn would come up again every four or six weeks or
whatever time was appropriate. Note that this method immediately franchises
the risk management program. Teams will naturally turn to the office of IRM to
get help.
The upper level manager reviewing the findings will add definition to any
of the parameters generated simply by asking why the team assigned a certain
number to a parameter. This system might well be chaotic at the start but time
will add definition, stability and insight.
STEPS FOR THE REPORT
There are five basic steps that each team will have to take in order to
generate the required information: background, threats, metric, reconciliation
and transition. Each of these steps will provide a integral piece of their report.
Ste0 1: Background
In the background step there are three separate pieces of required
information:
• Determine the purpose/objective of the IPT
° Write out the success statement of the IPT
• List the ground rules and assumptions of the IPT
The purpose of the background information is to insure that everyone
has the same basic understanding of the basic function of the IPT, i.e., what
they are supposed to do, how they will know if they have done it, and the ground
rules covering the doing. Note that all three of these pieces of information will
change with time.
Steo 2: Threats - Too Ten Plus One
Each IPT needs to develop a top ten plus one threat list. The first part of
this report contains a list of about ten threats. The term about ten is used to
allow some flexibility in the number of threats listed. The intent is to not
discourage a fairly significant eleventh or twelfth threat or to encourage the
manufacture of a tenth threat.
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The following information should be contained with each threat:
• What it is a threat to
• Whether the threat is up, down, self, or across
• The confidence in the analysis
• The consequences
• The likelihood
• Prodromal events
Each of the above items should be expressed in a paragraph form. The
confidence, likelihood, and consequence should include in their paragraph a
rating on the five point scale mentioned above. A brief justification for the
rating should also be included.
The second part of this report should contain a dark horse. The dark
horse is presented without any justification. It is the single thing in the
managers mind that is worrying them but is still vague. The intent here is to
encourage them to present unsubstantiated feeling of risk to management.
This report should be formulated by the IPT and go to the ,&.ITand to the
Office of IRM. One of the functions of the IRM would be to insure that the
information is circulated to the concerned offices. The report should be
presented, as previously discussed, to upper management on a regular
basis.
Steo 3: The Metric
The intent here is to present a metric which reflects the risk to the
objectives and success statements. The metric is developed by each IPT and
consists of three parts. The IPT evaluates the risk to themselves. Note that
this is not a trade study but an evaluation of whether the IPT feels that they can
do what they are supposed to do.
Three parameters are purposed, cost, schedule, and performance. The
method is to fix two of the three and then to evaluate a confidence level in
being able to accomplish the third, given the first two. The confidence is to be
evaluated between 0 and 1 in 0.1 increments.
• Performance
Given your current schedule and budget the confidence that you will
meet your technical performance goals is
• Cost
Given your current schedule and technical performance goal, the
confidence that you will meet your cost goals is
• Schedule
Given your current budget and technical performance goal, the
confidence that you will meet your schedule is
There are any number of parameters that could have been proposed.
However, in the interest of developing a simple program with a chance of
acceptance, these three were considered the most important.
.&`gain,use will provide definition to these parameters. Their most
significant use will come with the tracking of the parameters over time.
Trending will provide upper management with a large amount of information
on risk and on abatement.
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The tendency to combine the three metdcs into one will only obscure
information and should be avoided. The recommendation that each of the
three be tracked separately is yet another reason to restricting ourselves to
three metrics.
It is fully expected that each IPT will avail themselves of sophisticated
methods to establish the value of the parameters. It may well even be true that
each IPT uses a different method. However, over time and with experience, it
is reasonable to suppose that some methods will prevail and become
common. Here, the intent is to let use determine the method as opposed to
method determining the use.
_;tep 4; Reconciliation
The top'ten plus one list should be compared to the three metrics
generated to see if the information plays well together. Logic and consistency
are important. In essence, the IPT has verified their feelings on risk by working
the problem two different ways, one in paragraph form and the other with the
metrics. This part of the report should be in paragraph form and discuss how
the two different parts support each other.
_teo 5: Transition
Risk management is dynamic. The RM plan requires a periodic review
to insure it is meeting its required objectives and to insure that the objectives
themselves have not changed. As the program becomes more operational in
nature, significant changes in the definition of success will occur forcing
changes in the IRM plan. Step 5 in the report is a paragraph discussing how
the office plans to deal with the change from a risk perspective.
CONCLUSIONS
As was stated earlier in the paper, this is a tentative beginning of the
development of the foundations of risk management. Surely significant
changes and modifications will occur with time. The question now becomes
one of whether the implementation of such a program is worth the overhead
that it brings. Can a program afford to implement an IRM plan?
One of the problems with technical decision making is that non-technical
people understand neither the principles involved nor the process. Given this,
they have to trust the technocrat to do what is right and correct. One thing is
resoundingly clear, if the community as a whole loses their faith in the
technocrats to make the "good" decision, they can shut the whole process
down. If Congress loses its faith in NASA, they can stop the space station. If
the public loses its faith in a company, they can force financial ruin. If the
auditors and accountants lose their faith in the design team they can stop a
project.
Given this and given the high risk of many technical decisions, the
question more properly becomes one of can a company or program afford not
to institute a formal risk management plan?
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